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Non-technical summary
This empirical analysis addresses the attractiveness of European financial centers. The presented research tackles an issue that is fundamental to the understanding of organizational behavior in finance -the rationale in the decision-making process of market participants and its consequences for an economy. The results provide a unique insight into market participants' views on factors that affect the locational attractiveness of a financial center over time, taking into account assessments before, during, and after the financial crisis. This analysis of market participants' views is carried out by explaining their assessment of financial centers' attractiveness with their assessment of central influencing factors.
In particular, the results reveal that cluster concentration with a speedy information exchange within dense social networks is a competitive advantage. In comparison, an existing specialized pool of labor without concentration seems not to be relevant, as the human capital factor is relatively mobile in an increasingly integrated Europe. Furthermore, governmental support and parameters of regulation strongly determine a location's attractiveness for financial institutions, whereas the level of taxation seems not to be important on the micro level. Despite some progress in establishing a level playing field in the EU, the financial market is not yet fully harmonized and countries can take different paths in regulation as long as there is scope for interpretation. Hence, even minor differences in financial regulation within the EU may lead to regulatory arbitrage. Overall, financial centers' attractiveness varies over time, in comparison to relatively persistent location factors. The findings do not hinge on differences in market participants' socio-economic background. It is shown that fund companies seem to value the attractiveness of a financial center much more than banks, insurance companies, and corporates. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze

Introduction
The global financial crisis of the late 2000s demonstrated the inadequacy of the regulatory framework in safeguarding the financial system's stability and exerted enormous negative effects on the real economy. Financial institutions collapsed or were bought out; on a national level, governments were forced to respond rapidly with rescue packages in order to bail out their banking sector. Interestingly, a large fraction of the activities involving so-called "toxic assets," which essentially caused the crisis, were created by financial companies in financial centers, where, despite the spatial proximity of financial counterparties, concerns about counterparty credit risks spread quickly. In addition, there were significant amounts of job lay-offs in these centers. Financial centers are considered agglomerated bundles of the institutions responsible for capital and risk allocation of an economy, such as stock exchanges, banks, insurance and investment fund companies, or other service companies, such as consulting firms or software companies. A financial center can be defined as a nexus of ties between companies and institutions in a geographically defined area, which are involved in functions that enable and facilitate financial transactions (Lang, 2012: 31-32) .
The rise and fall of major financial centers and their attractiveness per se are a topic of long-standing interest. They do not emerge out of nowhere or overnight. The financial industry has always been concentrated in a few cities whose respective significance has waxed and waned over time. Today, the earliest European capitals of money, such as Antwerps, Augsburg, Bruges, or Florence are of no more than local relevance, if any at all. Cities such as Paris or London have continued to be of great significance, and locations such as Luxembourg, Zurich, and Frankfurt have gained importance for the financial industry (e.g., Cassis, 2006) . Interest in financial centers has been spurred on by the rise of new counterparts, such as the Asian former regional centers of Hong Kong, Seoul, Shanghai, and Singapore, to the preeminent European hubs, as well as new financial centers in the Arab world (e.g., Qatar)
seeking to establish an international presence.
Governments have reason to attract financial institutions and facilitate cross-border activities as these typically offer advantages to their host cities and countries, including higher paying jobs and increased personal income, wealth, and tax revenues. Several transmission channels allow further benefits due to the relationship of banking and the economy (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Aghion et al., 2005 and This paper analyzes the attractiveness of major European financial centers, the influence of location factors on the quality of the microeconomic business environment and their impact on the attractiveness over time. The relevance of changes in location factors have thus far only been subject to speculation, but have never been measured empirically. The results provide a unique insight into experts' judgment of the European financial centers and decisive location factors before, during, and after the financial crisis. This paper provides new evidence about market participants' assessments, thus delving into the "decision rule" governing the operations of financial institutions.
The results show that the decisive part of the comparative advantage in a financial center lies outside the company and even outside its industry. The speedy information exchange within dense social networks increases attractiveness. In comparison, an existing specialized pool of labor without concentration seems not to be relevant, as the human capital factor is relatively mobile in an increasingly integrated Europe. Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that the assessment of a financial center's attractiveness varies significantly over time.
Nevertheless, the results also indicate that the decisive location factors are persistent over time. The attractiveness of the benchmark country Germany was higher at the peak of the financial crisis (it was acting as a safe haven in the European financial market), but lower after than before the financial crisis. However, the domestic sales market is a sufficient but not necessary condition for attractiveness. Support by the government strongly increases attractiveness. Consequently, the regulatory framework is an additional crucial determinant.
On the other hand, the level of tax burden seems to be less important in competition between business locations. The results emphasize that in contrast to the location factors, the socio-economic background of the actors (age, work experience, education, and location) is negligible, and the empirical findings cannot confirm differences in individual behavior.
Nevertheless, the probability of reporting an increase in attractiveness is lower for market participants from fund companies, who tend to be more pessimistic about the attractiveness of a financial center than actors from other sectors. Interestingly, their impact is the strongest among all considered determinants. Thus, investment fund companies seem to value the attractiveness of a financial center much more than banks, insurance companies, and corporates. Economists have long been concerned with the way companies are restricted by the external environment (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985; Kogut and Zander, 1996) .
Simultaneously, a specific strand of research theory addresses the particular analysis of companies' agglomeration (e.g., Kaldor, 1972; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Krugman, 1991; Venables, 1996; Porter, 1990 Porter, , 1998 Porter, , 2000 . Since the work of Reed (1981) , many studies have been devoted to classifying financial centers and organizing them into a hierarchy (e.g., Poon et al., 2004) . These studies often base their analysis on a set of quantitative characteristics, such as the number of foreign banks or market capitalization. However, that sort of approach has its limits. Although it allows for the comparison of a large number of financial centers, it fails to identify the particularly critical factors over time. Other studies are based on a detailed description of historical developments, findings through interviews and surveys (e.g., Abraham et al., 1994; Dietl et al., 1999 , Bindemann, 1999 Harrschar-Ehrnborg, 2002; Financial Center Initiative, 2003; Cassis, 2006; Geiger and Kappel, 2006; Lannoo, 2007) .
Sometimes they expose detailed comparisons between financial centers in Europe and the optimal design of an international financial center. However, many surveys are conducted in small groups of participants and usually each group only participates once. Hence, it is unclear whether their findings are robust over time. 2 Therefore, this study seeks to close this research gap.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the structure of the survey approach and the characteristics of the participating financial experts will be explained. To become familiar with the principal characteristics of the data a detailed descriptive impression on the findings will be given in Chapter 3. Afterwards in Chapter 4, an in-depth analysis of the results with a pooled ordered probit model will be provided. By calculating the marginal effects, it is possible to further measure the elements that might lead to attractiveness within the different assessment levels. Chapter 5 concludes.
Empirical Setting and Data
This section presents the analysis of the data set. Therefore, in a first step the structure of the survey approach and the characteristics of the participating financial experts will be explained. The dataset consists of four surveys that were jointly conducted with the "ZEW 2 The amount of literature which applies economic geography approaches on finance and banking in terms of their locations has also grown over the last two decades (e.g., Dow, 1990; Corbridge et al. 1994; Porteous, 1995; Thrift and Leyshon, 1997; Cohen, 1998; Laulajainen, 1998; Martin, 1999; Klagge and Martin, 2005; Clark, 2006; Gärtner, 2009; Capelle-Blancard and Tadjeddine, 2010; see Martin, 2011) . 3 Among the respondents are financial experts from research, economic and finance departments, fund managers and investment consultants (e.g., Schmidt and Nautz, 2012: 4-5) . 4 As it is important to formulate appropriate questions in a survey, the questionnaire design was aligned with the guidelines of Groves et al. (2009 ), Schaeffer et al. (2003 , and Bradburn et al. (2004) . [insert Figure 1 about here]
The questionnaire was then used in a pre-test with market experts as a final check of its acceptance and appropriateness. The questionnaire, which was used for each survey from 2008
to 2011, consists of eight questions that aim at evaluating the attractiveness of financial centers and relevant location factors in theory and practice. The participants first gave a detailed, exemplary assessment of Germany, their domestic market, before they evaluated the aggregate fulfillment of location factors in the most important competing countries with hubs in Europe, which are France, Germany, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. The selected group of countries was chosen because it includes countries with different characteristics.
5
All questions were to be answered on an ordinal scale with three to five ordered grades and the additional option to add further aspects missing from the questionnaire. 6 The used scale format follows the Likert bipolar scaling method that measures either positive or negative assessments to a statement. Table 1 summarizes different location factors with their sub-criteria. Location factors can be determined and sorted by groups, which might be of particular relevance for the attractiveness of a financial center from the theoretical and empirical point of view. The development and interaction of these factors, influenced by changes in other countries, should explain the ups and downs in attractiveness.
[insert Table 1 about here] 5 Roughly, one can say that Great Britain is attractive for financial activities related to the capital market, Luxembourg is famous for the concentration of its asset management industry (with a small domestic market size), and Switzerland is well-known for its private banking, asset management activities as well as banking secrecy. Germany's financial industry is highly intertwined with the industry sector, and similar to France, also known for its large domestic market size in Europe. 6 The ordinal scale provides sufficient details while not overstraining the respondents (Groves, 2009 ).
In addition to this first questionnaire, a second separate questionnaire was sent out once, in which survey participants were asked to give information on personal characteristics. At least 612 of 730 observations in total provided their personal data. Consequently, socioeconomic characteristics data on 84 percent of the sample is available. Hence, it is possible to draw conclusions about how different personal characteristics influence market participants' assessment and whether the financial crisis affected individuals differently. An overview considering this socio-economic information is given in Table 2 .
[insert Table 2 [insert Figure 2 about here]
The second question of the survey provides a picture of how the other European financial centers in focus are ranked. The results indicate a trend similar to the previous assessments of Germany. As can be seen in Figure 3 , the share of negative estimates is the lowest in the crisis year of 2009. The same picture is given for France, also characterized by a large domestic market size; however, in general, the participants give France a more pessimistic outlook than the other countries. More than half of all respondents assess the environment in France as (very) unattractive, even after the crisis, in 2011, with a proportion of 86 percent. As such, both countries were deemed by the surveyed experts to have benefited from the crisis. In case of an incipient improvement in market conditions, they would however suffer from a loss in popularity which would return them to pre-crisis circumstances.
A contrasting development is given for Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Before (2008) and after the crisis (2011), they were rated at their best levels. Hence, the worst-ranking countries France and Germany seem to be the winners of the crisis at the expense of the other three. Both countries' means went up in 2009 but subsequently fell again when the financial market began to recover from the crisis. It is evident that standard deviations increased in in the crisis for all countries, especially for France and the UK.
[insert Figure 3 about here]
Moreover, the participants have been asked, on the one hand, about the relevance of specific location factors from a theoretical point of view for an ideal financial center (depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 4 ) and, on the other hand, about the real levels for the benchmark financial center (depicted in Figure 4 on the right side). This comparison shows the difference between need and reality over time. At first glance, it is apparent that all factors have been assessed as important from a theoretical point of view. In particular, political and legal stability seem to play the most important role, while economic stability as well as supervisory and regulatory framework conditions are also rated high. These three factors also exhibit relatively low standard deviations, indicating a large consensus among the respondents.
In contrast, most disagreement is observed for the relevance of soft factors and market potential, which are regarded as sufficient for the growth of a financial center. For the complete observed period, the cluster concentration of important market participants as well as the availability of human capital were both also rated important (greater than 1). Both factors have exhibited similar magnitude. The average results regarding location factor development indicate that location factors are relatively persistent over time. These results can be affiliated to a steady mindset during times of crisis. Yet, interesting differences can be identified.
Average values for cost-related factors (taxation) and innovation potential dropped during the crisis and increased again afterwards. A different course can be observed for other factors. For instance, the need for legal and financial stability becomes more important during the crisis, as does the need for the concentration of other important market participants and soft factors in the cluster.
The levels of realization show a different picture for the benchmark financial center.
Comparisons of the means indicate that all factors are seen in a worse light, whereas the results for soft factors at least distinguish between theory and practice. In particular, it appears that the fiscal and regulatory frameworks in Germany differ the most from the theoretical need during the entire time period. In comparison, the assessments regarding the supervisory and regulatory framework have been interpreted as slightly lacking. However, the experts' assessments improve for both the crisis year and the subsequent year. The opinion also holds true for both human capital cluster factors. The realizations are relatively close to and consistent with theory on stability indicators regarding the political, economic and market environment. These results may reflect the broadly established financial industry in Germany and its relatively small proportion of the German value added. 4 Econometric Analysis
Econometric Model and Testing
In the next step, an econometric model provides an in-depth-analysis of the results. Multinomial logit or probit analyses would fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variables. Ordinary regression techniques would err in the opposite direction, because they do not recognize the information content of one grade difference, i.e., estimation may vary along the used Likert scale. For example, the linear regression model would treat the difference between 1 and 2 in the same way as the difference between 2 and 3, whereas in fact the ordinal difference might be greater or smaller. Therefore, an ordered probit model is 7 For further results of this analysis, see Lang (2012): Basically, the surveyed experts assess government efforts in Germany on a five-step scale of school grades between "one" (i.e., A=excellent) and "five" (i.e., F=fail) with poor grades (see Figure 5 ). Exactly 50 percent of respondents assessed government efforts with the grades "four" or "five" (D or F) before the crisis.
estimated, as initially proposed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) , which is able to account for the ordered differences among the response categories (see Greene, 2012) .
Formally, the latent regression of the ordered probit model is specified as follows:
The following categories are then assigned to the unknown Y * :
where z is an unknown threshold that defines, which values of Y * correspond to the observable outcome Y . The thresholds 1 z to 4 z themselves are unknown and will be estimated along with the parameters β and α. X is a matrix of the independent variables for each individual i, α i is the constant term, and ε a normally distributed error term. The underlying assumption is that the five respondent categories are ordered from the lowest to the highest level and that the threshold levels are positively increasing as 0 < 1
Taking this into account, the probability function of it Y has the following form:
where Φ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution. Furthermore, the marginal effects are estimated to assess the effects of changes in the covariates on the response probabilities. The marginal effects from every independent variable, evaluated at their means, are calculated as follows:
with φ being the standard normal density. Based on the theoretical specifications described above, the following model is estimated by ordered probit: Table 3 .
[insert Table 3 Answer categories range from levels 1 to 5, where 1 means "much worse" and 5 means "much better," respectively.
The majority of these independent variables should have a positive impact on Y because, from a theoretical point of view, their increase is always accompanied with an increase in attractiveness. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the sign of the influence of these factors is always positive.
There are numerous benefits of a cluster 8 associated with the proximity to other market participants, greater access to information flows, and lower coordination costs. Porter (1998 Porter ( , 2000 shows that among individuals, geographical and cultural proximity as well as close institutional terms lead to advantages in productivity growth and entrepreneurial activity due to, e.g., special relationships with better incentives and information that are difficult to tap from a distance. The network of companies and public institutions leads to many cluster 8 It is broadly recognized that the observed spatial configuration of economic activities is in general the outcome of a process involving two opposing types of forces. These centripetal (agglomeration) and centrifugal (dispersion) forces lead to a balance of forces that push and pull consumers and companies (Fujita and Thisse, 2002: 5) .
advantages, which have positive externalities or spillover effects across companies and industries.
Dense social networks provide strong reasons for agglomeration, for example clustering in the Silicon Valley (i.e., "you can change jobs without changing the parking lots"). Saxenian (1994) pointed out that the region was essentially identical to Boston (Route 128) in the 1970s.
However, the two locations did not have identical characteristics. Offering an entrepreneurial culture of rapid changes and quick decisions, the Silicon Valley subsequently transformed into a relatively more productive environment.
Dense clique-like local networks are strengthened over time by shared beliefs and perceptions (mental models), e.g., of how markets work, and enable market participants to interpret the behavior of others (Baum et al., 2003: 702) . Zaheer and Bell (2005) analyze syndicate networks of Canadian mutual fund companies and find that cognitive embeddedness and the formation of mental models within clique-like interconnected market participants lead to persistent network structures.
Granovetter (2005) gives further evidence that social networks in general affect economic outcome, as they (1) improve the flow and quality of information, (2) facilitate reward and punishment mechanisms, and (3) foster trust among market participants. Florida and Gates (2001) examine the effects of soft location factors, such as cultural diversity. They find that clusters with a culture of openness tend to innovate more than less creative cities.
Since knowledge becomes more specialized over time, a cluster-specific division of labor and institutional organization enables the emergence of distinctive approaches to learning and knowledge creation (see Bell et al., 2009: 624-625) . Corresponding findings show that the strength -and not just the existence -of relationships between market participants in a cluster is crucial for enabling the exchange of private information and the The influence of geographical location is of particular interest to the investigation.
Individuals inside the financial center may have greater knowledge about comparative advantages of financial centers. According to Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) , new relationships are attracted more strongly by existing close ties and the parties' partners. This leads to an environment of social embedding due to processes of indirect referrals and trust formation. In the course of collaboration within the cluster, the interaction between market participants through jointly attended (in-) formal events and meetings further shape their mental maps and thus their subsequent behavior (i.e., Weick et al., 2005) . Therefore, this analysis tests whether office location, in or outside the major financial center (FINCENTER), alters the results.
Thus, it is possible that these experts experienced the crisis differently. If there are differences in the assessment of attractiveness due to the industry an expert belongs to, the sector dummy variables should be significant. Working for a bank (BANKS) is the benchmark. However, the German fund industry is often characterized as a large domestic market, whereas the distribution of funds often differs from the domiciliation due to disparities in environment conditions (e.g., Luxembourg and Dublin; see Lang and Köhler, 2011).
Therefore, a negative sign for FUNDCOMPANY is expected.
Empirical Results
The empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. In the first step of the examination the paper uses time dummy variables to check whether the assessments of financial experts have changed over time. The estimated results are given in Model 1 of Table 4 . For deeper insight, other factors are considered in the next step, namely the individual reviews of location factors and socio-economic background information of the experts. The results of this estimation are presented in models 2 to 4 of Table 4 . The problem of multicollinearity appears not to exist, since the correlation among explanatory variable is not high. The estimation of the same models with robust standard errors leads to very similar results and are therefore not reported.
The results seem to be robust, since the estimates do not vary much across the models.
[insert Table 4 about here] 
Time Effects
Comparison of Location Factors
The In addition, this work tests whether tax issues (TAX) are relevant for attractiveness. But the results show no direct relationship between the structure of the tax system and attractiveness. This corresponds to the assessments of interviewees in the pre-test, since they particularly pointed out that continuity in taxation is often much more important for their businesses than the level of taxation. Changes in the level of taxation increase planning uncertainty and provoke cost-intensive process adjustments in each financial institution.
However, the existing double tax treaty may significantly reduce the influence of different system structures. 9 Brulhart and Jametti (2006) emphasize that either harmonization reduces the tax base, which compels a benevolent government to restrict public goods, or competition improves welfare because it constrains big governments. Regarding the issue of the corporate tax level, Becker and Fuest (2011) show that the optimal tax policy for a government to prevent companies from leaving the country depends on how profitable mobile companies are, relatively to immobile companies in a country. Moreover, they show that a tax rate cut cum
The also non-significant result on the availability of qualified employees and knowledge transfers (HUMANCAPITAL) may have similar reasons. The result implies that the attractiveness of a financial center does not directly rely on the local supply of labor. In the financial sector companies can recruit the required labor across national borders. This result could be motivated by an increasing possibility of labor movement with fewer regulations on labor issues, particularly in the EU.
The results give strong evidence that supervisory and regulatory conditions are relevant for the attractiveness of a financial center. This was expected. The variable REGULATION is positive and significant at the 5-percent level in the models. This result suggests that small regulatory differences, in contrast to tax differences, may lead to more geographical consequences, in terms of regulation arbitrage.
Furthermore, the experts were also consulted on the stability level of the political and legal system (STABPOL) and on the stability of the overall economic system (STABECON).
The latter stands e.g. for price stability and economic development; however, these variables Descriptive results have illustrated that the respondents are very dissatisfied with government efforts to create a favorable environment. The variables in the econometric base broadening policy in a country increases welfare by redistributing the tax burden from mobile to immobile companies if the marginal mobile company is more profitable than the average company, and vice versa. But in reality governments may not be able to observe a company's mobility level.
analysis regarding the assessments of government efforts are divided into two questions, one on the very short-term implementations (GOVC) and one on efforts made in the last two years (GOVY). The results of the analysis show that government efforts are considered very important for the growth of a cluster. The corresponding coefficients in the models have positive signs and are weakly significant (on the 10-percent level) for short-term efforts and strongly significant (on the 1-percent level) for the longer term. Nevertheless, the overall findings contradict the assumptions in the literature about globalized financial markets with no or less and less room for governmental maneuvers (e.g., Sassen, 1999; Porter, 2000) .
Socio-Economic Background
In the next step of the analysis, this paper checks whether socio-economic characteristics have an impact on the assessment of financial centers' attractiveness. The results show that in contrast to location factors the socio-economic background of the respondents is negligible.
The horizon of experience does not determine the empirical results, so that differences in the characteristics of age (AGE), level of education (UNI) and the associated professional and specific experience in the business world (JOBEX and FINEX) are irrelevant. As opposed to the general literature (i.e., senior managers would be more reluctant to change their beliefs and managers earlier in their careers have less established beliefs; the empirical findings cannot confirm differences in behavior. Moreover, experts geographically located in and outside financial centers (FINCENTER) do not seem to have different mindsets, either. Working for a BANK, INSURANCE or a CORPORATE does not matter at all.
Interestingly, however, a clear difference can be found for employees of a fund company. Fund companies generally judge the attractiveness of the financial center negatively.
This meets the expectations of a specific view in this specific industry. In all models the coefficient for FUNDCOMPANY is negative and strongly significant at the 1-percent level.
Overall Fit of the Models
To test the relative strength of the models, this analysis uses a Likelihood Ratio test (LR test) to examine the group-specific heterogeneity in Table 4 (see Greene, 2012) . The LR test compares the log likelihoods of two models and tests whether this difference is statistically significant. If the difference is statistically significant, then the less restrictive model is said to fit the data significantly better than the more restrictive model (the one with less variables).
The LR test was conducted in a restricted model with the same number of observations (472).
The LR test shows that the differences between models (4) and (3), (2) or (1) are significant at the 1-percent level. According to the values of the log likelihood function and the results of the LR tests, the most general model (4) is the preferred one.
Marginal Effects
In the next step, the influence of the variance of the independent variables on the dependent variable is analyzed per unit. By calculating the marginal effect, it is possible to further determine the elements that might lead to attractiveness within the different assessment levels. Table 5 presents the results on the marginal effects. These findings support the previous results; the signs of the marginal effects are mostly consistent with the signs of the coefficients presented in Table 4 . The results of the marginal effects (Table 5 ) are demonstrated regarding the individual questionnaire categories from (1) to (5). Overall, the probability of reporting an increase in attractiveness of a financial center (choosing category 4 or 5 -attractive or very attractive -in the questionnaire) rises with market size, concentration of important market participants, better regulatory framework and greater efforts by the government. On the other hand, the probability decreases for respondents from fund companies, who tend to be more pessimistic about the attractiveness of a financial center than respondents from other sectors.
Interestingly, their impact is the strongest among all considered variables. Thus, investment fund companies seem to value the attractiveness of a financial center much more than banks, insurance companies, and corporates.
[insert Table 5 about here]
Conclusion
This paper aims to help explain the puzzle of financial centers' attractiveness. In order to achieve this, the discussion sheds light on the quality of microeconomic business environments and their relationship with influencing location factors over time. The results provide a unique insight into experts' judgment on location factors and European financial centers before, during, and after the financial crisis. Due to the time period covered, it provides deeper understandings of changing views regarding the general determinants relevant to financial intermediaries, which to a great extent depend on several external conditions. Thus, the findings fill the gap of variations in the relevance of location factors, which have previously not been empirically analyzed and have hence been subject to speculation.
First, the empirical evidence shows that the assessment of a financial center's attractiveness varies significantly over time. An important implication of this study is that it appears that countries considered least attractive before the recent financial crisis (i.e., Germany and France) caught up during the crisis but afterward plummeted even below precrisis levels. Conversely, it also appears that countries considered most attractive before the crisis regained or exceeded their advantage after the crisis. This applies to countries with very specialized financial centers and which are heavily reliant on financial exports (i.e., London, Luxembourg), which as such offer competitive advantages even in normal times.
Second, the relevant location factors are persistent. The results show that the decisive part of the comparative advantage in a financial center lies outside the company and even outside its industry. The speedy information exchange within dense social networks increases attractiveness. In comparison, an existing specialized pool of labor without concentration seems not to be relevant, as the human capital factor is relatively mobile in an increasingly integrated Europe.
Further, this analysis does not find that governments have lost their influence on competition to global forces. Support by the government strongly increases the attractiveness of a location; however, the advantage is due more to the regulation framework than the level of the tax burden. Market size can positively affect attractiveness, but is not a prerequisite.
Third, the variation in the socio-economic background of market participants is negligible and cannot indicate different individual behavior. Intriguingly, fund companies tend to be more pessimistic about financial centers' attractiveness than respondents from other sectors and their impact is the strongest among all considered sectors.
Overall, direct policy recommendations can be drawn out of the findings, as financial centers do not emerge out of nowhere or overnight. The results emphasize that, in order to explain the emergence of financial centers in specific regions, it is nevertheless necessary to focus on former companies' early decisions, and on how other companies later make subsequent location decisions because of the advantages of spatial proximity to the early arrivals. These lock-in effects very often lead to inefficiencies as they do not induce institutions to relocate even if another location provides more favorable conditions. The consequence of their relocation decision depends on the mobility level of the individual institution. (1) (2) (3) Source: Own calculation; P values in brackets; Standard errors (se) in parentheses; † Significance at the 15% level; * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. The LR test refers to the comparison with the most general model (4). Source: Own calculation; Standard errors in parentheses (se); † Significance at the 15% level,* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level.
APPENDIX
